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ARUNDEL CORP. v. MARIE: 
A Right of First Refusal Is Void under the Traditional 
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities as well as the 
Legislative Modification of that Rule 
By: Emily J. King 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a right of first 
refusal is void under the traditional common law rule against 
perpetuities as well as the legislative modification of that rule. 
Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 860 A.2d 886 (2004). The 
Court also declined to modify the common law rule, expressing its 
belief that any modification should be reserved for the legislature. !d. 
On July 28, 1960, Camille and Mary Marie ("Maries") 
conveyed a parcel of land, which was part of a tract owned by them, to 
the Arundel Corporation ("Arundel"). In consideration of one dollar, 
the deed gave Arundel a right of first refusal to purchase the portion of 
the property the Maries retained. The Maries agreed that whenever 
they or their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns decided to sell 
the property, Arundel, its successors and assigns would be offered the 
additional property for a price of $2,250 per acre. 
Camille Marie, having survived his wife Mary, died intestate. 
The couple's children, Olivia Dulany Green and Richard Mercer Marie 
("personal representatives"), were appointed personal representatives 
of Camille's Estate ("Estate"). The personal representatives wrote to 
Arundel and informed the corporation of their intent to sell the 
property and distribute all of the Estate assets, free of the right of first 
refusal. The personal representatives asked Arundel to disclaim its 
interest in the Marie property, but Arundel refused, countering that the 
right of first refusal had vested, and therefore was enforceable. 
Arundel further claimed that even if the right was void under the 
common law rule against perpetuities ("the Rule"), the vesting of their 
right of first refusal was in conformance with the modified rule found 
in MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS§ 11-103(a) (2004) ("Section 11-
103 "). 
Arundel filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 
which granted summary judgment in favor of the personal 
representatives, concluding the right of first refusal was void under the 
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Rule and could not be saved by Section 11-103. Arundel appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative to determine if the right 
of first refusal was void under the Rule or if it could be saved by 
Section 11-103. 
The Rule states, "'[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at 
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest."' !d. at 495, 860 A.2d at 890 (quoting Gray, 
The Rule Against Perpetuities, § 201 (41h ed. 1942)). The Rule was 
designed to prevent the alienability of property and the controlling of 
property by the dead. !d. Since its inception, however, it has confused 
many people and presented difficultie~ in application. !d. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that many state legislatures 
revised the Rule because of its harsh effect and the often illogical 
possibilities it proposes. !d. at 496, 860 A.2d at 891. In 1960, the 
Maryland General Assembly passed an earlier version of what is now 
Section 11-103(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article. !d. at 497, 860 
A.2d at 891. That statute reads as follows: 
!d. 
In applying the rule against perpetuities 
to an interest limited to take effect at or 
after the termination of one or more life 
estates in, or lives of, persons in being 
when the period of the rule commences 
to run, the validity of the interest shall be 
determined on the basis of facts existing 
at the termination of one or more life 
estates or lives. In this section an 
interest which must terminate not later 
than the death of one or more persons is 
a "life estate" even though it may 
terminate at an earlier date. 
The Court determined that the Maryland General Assembly 
had several models to choose from when drafting the modification to 
the Rule. The first approach is currently in effect in Pennsylvania. !d. 
at 498, 860 A.2d at 892. The Pennsylvania method "waits" until the 
end of the period allotted by the Rule to "see" if a future interest will 
vest. !d. at 497-498, 860 A.2d at 892. 
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The second approach originated in Massachusetts and is more 
limited than the Pennsylvania approach. !d. at 498, 860 A.2d at 892. 
The Massachusetts method "waits" only until the end of the life estate 
or life in being to "see" if a future interest will vest. !d. at 498, 860 
A.2d at 892. The drafters of this method believed it to be more 
realistic than the common law Rule because it removes the absurd 
possibilities that could invalidate the vesting of the interest. !d. 
The third approach has been adopted by the Kentucky, 
Vermont, and Washington legislatures. !d. at 499, 860 A.2d at 893. 
This method allows a court to look at the intention of the creator to 
determine if an interest is valid and whether to incorporate actual 
events, as opposed to possible events, in that consideration. !d. at 500, 
860 A.2d at 893. 
The fourth approach was developed more recently. In 1986, a 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was proposed by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. !d. at 
501, 860 A.2d at 893. Under the uniform rule, a "future interest would 
be valid if either (1) it complies with the common law rule against 
perpetuities, or (2) it vests or terminates within ninety years after its 
creation." !d. at 501, 860 A.2d at 893-94. 
The Court found that the Maryland General Assembly adopted 
the Massachusetts approach. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 894. The General 
Assembly modified the strict common law Rule by "waiting" until the 
end of the life estate or life in being to "see" if the future interest will 
vest. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 894-95. 
The Court of Appeals determined that Arundel's argument that 
the statute saves the right of first refusal cannot stand because the right 
of first refusal is not sure to vest at the end of a particular life estate or 
life in being. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 895. The Maries could have sold 
their property and activated the right of first refusal at any time during 
their lives. !d. at 502-503, 860 A.2d at 895. The Court also reasoned 
that the right of first refusal is invalid under the Rule because the 
vesting could take place too remotely. !d. at 503, 860 A.2d at 895. It 
is possible that neither the Maries nor any of their heirs would ever 
actually sell their property. !d. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a right of first 
refusal is void under the common law rule against perpetuities, as well 
as the Maryland General Assembly's modification of that Rule. The 
Court has also declined the opportunity to further modify the Rule, 
deeming that to be the job of the Legislature. The Court noted that the 
Legislature has, on several occasions, declined to modify the Rule any 
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further. It is likely, therefore, that the Rule will not be modified by the 
legislature either and will remain in its current format indefinitely, thus 
rendering the right of first refusal void indefinitely as well. 
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